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Abstract. The behavior of e-commerce agents can be deﬁned at diﬀer-
ent levels of abstraction. A formalism allowing to deﬁne them in terms of
their economic activities, Utility State Machines, has been proposed. Due
to its high level of abstraction, this formalism focuses on describing the
economic goals rather on how they are achieved. Though this approach
is suitable to specify the objectives of e-commerce agents, as well as to
construct formal analysis methodologies, this framework is not suitable
to deﬁne the strategic behavior of agents. In this paper we develop a
new formalism to explicitly deﬁne the strategic behavior of agents in a
modular way. In particular, we reinterpret the role of utility functions,
already used in USMs in a more restrictive manner, so that they deﬁne
strategic preferences and activities of agents. We apply the formalism
to deﬁne the agents in a benchmark e-commerce agent environment, the
Supply Chain Management Game. Since the strategic behavior of agents
is located in a speciﬁc part of the formalism, diﬀerent strategies can be
easily considered, which enhances the reusability of the proposed speci-
ﬁcation.
Keywords: Formal speciﬁcation of multi-agent systems, autonomous
agents, e-commerce.
1 Introduction
One of the most interesting applications of agent-oriented computation is the
area of agent-mediated e-commerce [1,2,3,4,5]. These agents can look for prof-
itable oﬀers, recommend products, negotiate with other agents, or, even au-
tonomously, perform transactions on behalf of their respective users. However,
users may be reluctant to delegate activities that dramatically aﬀect their pos-
sessions. On the one hand, they may think that agents are biased by the man-
ufacturer for commercial reasons. On the other hand, some users would never
(voluntarily) delegate critical activities to intelligent entities.
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The use of formal methods through the diﬀerent stages of a system develop-
ment increases the chance of ﬁnding and isolating mistakes in early phases of
the system creation. Formal languages are used to deﬁne the critical aspects of
the system under consideration, that is, to create a model of the system. Formal
speciﬁcation languages and formal semantics have been already used in the ﬁeld
of agent-oriented systems (see e.g. [6,7,8]). Then, some theoretical machinery
allows to analyze the model and extract some relevant properties concerning the
aspects included in the model. In this line we can mention model checking [9]
and its application to agent systems [10]. We can also consider that the model
is the speciﬁcation of the system under construction. Thus, we can compare its
behavior with that of a real system and test whether it correctly implements
the model [11]. Such approach is taken in the agents ﬁeld, for instance, in [12].
Regarding agent-mediated e-commerce, formal methods can be used to analyze
the high-level requirements of agents. These requirements can be deﬁned in eco-
nomic terms. Basically, the high-level objective of an e-commerce agent is “get
what the user said he wants and when he wants it”. Let us note that what the
user wants might include not only what goods or services he wants (e.g., DVD
movies) but also other conditions (e.g., he wants to keep his information private,
he wants to perform only legal transactions, etc).
Following these ideas, a formalism allowing to specify the high-level behavior
of autonomous e-commerce agents, as well as to test agents with respect to their
speciﬁcations, is proposed in [13,14,15]. Users objectives are deﬁned in terms of
their preferences, denoted in turn by means of utility functions. A utility function
associates a numerical value with each basket of resources, where a resource is
any scarce good that can be traded in the market. Preferences may change as
long as the time passes and objectives are fulﬁlled. Regarding the former, time
is used as a parameter in utility functions, that is, if x¯ and y¯ are baskets of
resources and f is a utility function, f(x¯, t) > f(y¯, t) means that, at time t, x¯
is preferred to y¯. Concerning the latter, the formalism allows agents to behave
according to diﬀerent utility functions depending on the current state of the
agent. We called Utility State Machines to our formalism. A USM is inspired
in the notion of ﬁnite state machine but it is more powerful. A set of variables
denote the current possessions of the user (i.e., the resources it can exchange
with other agents) and each state is provided with a utility function denoting
the objectives in the state. USMs evolve by changing their state, by performing
an exchange with other USMs, or by waiting for some time. By performing these
activities, they represent the economic behavior of an autonomous e-commerce
agent. The work in USMs has also been supported by the speciﬁcation of small
case studies such as the speciﬁcation of all the entities involved in the Kasbah
system [16].
Even though there is a well-founded theory underlying USMs, the application
of this formalism to the speciﬁcation of complex agents has not been as suc-
cessful as expected. In fact, our experimentation has detected some features of
the original formalism that are almost not needed when specifying a wide range
of diﬀerent agents. In contrast, although USMs have a big expressive power,
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this experimentation has also revealed that there are several agents character-
istics that can be expressed only in a very diﬃcult and intricate way. Thus, we
have decided to create a new formalism based on USMs but overcoming most
of its drawbacks. We call this new speciﬁcation language extended utility state
machines, in short, EUSM. The term extended indicates not only that these new
machines are an extension of the previous formalism; it also shows that these new
machines are more powerful since the speciﬁcation of some agent properties can
be done in a more straight way. Among the several modiﬁcations and additions,
we can remark the following structural contributions. First, utility functions al-
low now to specify not only short-term behavior but also strategic behavior.
Second, EUSMs allow to create general patterns to build agents; by modifying
some utility functions located in speciﬁc places, it is easy to deﬁne agents that,
following the same behavior, present completely diﬀerent characteristics.
In order to illustrate the features of our formalism, we apply it to the speciﬁ-
cation of a system that can be considered as a benchmark in the agent-mediated
e-commerce community: The Supply Chain Management Game [17]. In a few
words, in this system, agents face a simulated environment where they interact
with suppliers and customers to stock up with components and sell constructed
products, respectively. Next we brieﬂy introduce the main components in the
Supply Chain Management Game. We restrict ourselves to the most relevant as-
pects of the system. The system simulates an environment where PCs are traded.
Thus, the system contains ﬁnal consumers, vendors, and component providers.
The global behavior is very simple: Clients buy PCs to vendors, which in turn
buy the needed components to providers, ensemble them, and sell the ﬁnal PCs
to clients. While consumers and providers are simulated by the system, vendors
have to be implemented by the diﬀerent teams taking part in the game. As ex-
pected, the goal of these agents is to earn as much money as possible. Once
these agents simulating vendors are added to the system, they have to take
autonomous decisions. Each agent communicates with clients and component
providers by following a simple protocol. Agents receive requests for quotes from
the clients. Then, the agent sends quotes to the chosen clients (each agent can
decide with which clients it wants to make business). Next, the clients accept the
quotes that they like. Finally, the last communication is the transaction itself. It
is worth to point out that each quote contains not only the price and the number
of desired pieces, but also the reception date as well as the penalty to be paid in
case of late delivery. The communication of agents with providers is similar, but
exchanging in the previous dialogue the role of agent by the role of provider and
the role of client by the role of agent. That is, an agent sends a request for quotes
to the providers, and so on. In each game turn, the agents send to their factories
the requests for assembling some PCs by using the available components that
they bought in previous turns. The production capacity of each factory is not
unlimited. Moreover, to store both components and PCs has an associated cost.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In the next section we relate
the approach presented in this paper with some previous work. In Section 3, we
introduce the language constructions to deﬁne EUSMs. We will use the Supply
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Chain Management Game to show, along this section, the main EUSMs charac-
teristics. In Section 4 we deﬁne the operational behavior of EUSMs in terms of
their transitions. In Section 5 we show how to extend the concepts underlying
EUSMs to deal with multi-agent systems. In Section 6 we present some general
guidelines to deﬁne EUSMs. Finally, in Section 7 we present our conclusions and
some lines for future work.
2 Related Work
Several approaches have been proposed to formally deﬁne the behavior of e-
commerce systems. Most of them focus on providing models for checking the
validity of communications in these systems (see e.g.[18,19]). Clearly, these as-
pects are critical for the reliability of these systems. For instance, features such as
authentication, non-repudiation, integrity, and privacy are required in this kind
of systems [20]. These requirements are critical in other system domains as well,
so they are not speciﬁc to the e-commerce domain. Moreover, in these formal ap-
proaches entities are deﬁned in terms of low level activities (e.g. messages), not in
terms of their high level behavior (which, in this case, is the economic behavior).
Thus, considering their behavior in terms of economic concepts such as prefer-
ences, utilities, proﬁt or Pareto equilibria might be tricky or cumbersome. Sim-
ilarly, other formalisms allowing to formally deﬁne the behavior of autonomous
agents have been proposed (see e.g. AgentSpeak(L) [21] or 3APL [22]). Since they
are generic and do not focus on any speciﬁc agent-oriented application domain,
the decision-making procedures of entities are not deﬁned in economic terms
either. Some formalisms for deﬁning and analyzing decision-making scenarios
have been proposed. For example, we may consider Markov Decision Processes
(MDP) [23] and Partially Observable Markov Decision Processes (POMDP) [24].
In these formalisms, the speciﬁer totally or partially deﬁnes the consequences of
the agent decisions. For example, we may specify that, in a given state s, the
decision a will lead us to either a state s1 with proﬁt 2 or to a state s2 with proﬁt
3, with probabilities 0.25 and 0.75, respectively. Given this kind of information,
optimal sequences of decisions can be computed in some cases. Let us note that
composing these speciﬁcations requires to (partially or totally) know the actual
(probabilistic) consequences of taking each decision. Such a condition may be
unfeasible in several scenarios where the uncertainty about the environment is
too high to approximately deﬁne its behavior. However, providing entities with a
strategy is also required in these cases. In the approach presented in this paper,
we consider that models are provided with a strategy, but we are not concerned
with the data or the method followed to choose this strategy. On the contrary,
the formalism will focus on analyzing the behaviors of systems where each entity
is provided with a given strategy, regardless of its origin. That is, we will focus
on checking the consequences of taking these strategies (though this feedback
could be useful to choose them).
As we said before, the formalism presented in this paper, extended utility
state machines (EUSMs), are constructed from a previous formalism presented
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in [13,14,15], utility state machines (USMs). One could think that, in order to
consider the strategic behavior of agents, it is enough to reinterpret the meaning
of the utility functions associated to states in EUSMs so that they denote strategic
preferences rather than true preferences. For instance, let us suppose that I have
two apples and that, according to my true preferences, I assign the same utility
to one apple and to two oranges. Besides, let us suppose that, according to
my knowledge, I suspect that the relative price of apples is raising. In this case,
perhaps I should not accept now an exchange where I give one apple and I receive
two oranges, despite of the fact that it is acceptable for my true preferences (note
that my true utility would not decrease). Instead, I should act according to some
strategic preferences. For example, strategic preferences could denote that now
I give the same value to one apple and to ﬁve oranges.
Reinterpreting utility functions in this way in USMs is necessary but not suﬃ-
cient to properly denote agents with strategic behaviors. USMs have other char-
acteristics that have to be modiﬁed in order to provide a formalism allowing to
denote strategic behaviors. First, USMs require that agents have a positive utility
outcome before a given deadline is reached. Since utility functions will not de-
note true preferences in the new formalism, this is not suitable. Besides, in USMs
variables only denote the amounts of resources owned by the agent and the time.
However, in order to take strategic decisions, other variables (e.g., a historic ﬁle
of last transactions) are required. In USMs, utility functions are used only to en-
able/disable exchanges of resources. However, in order to deﬁne strategies in the
long term, utility functions should also be able to aﬀect other decisions not di-
rectly involving transactions. In USMs, the only available kind of communication
between agents is the exchange of resources, but it is not suitable for deﬁning
strategic scenarios where a transaction could be just the last step of a long term
negotiation process. Actually, since in USMs only resource variables are modiﬁed
in exchanges, it is not possible to aﬀect other variables that could be relevant
for the future strategy (e.g., the historic ﬁle). Finally, in USMs actions associated
to transitions do not depend on the actual values that are taken to make condi-
tions to hold, though registering these values could be useful for the strategy. As
we will see in the next section, the new formalism, EUSMs, will overcome these
problems by providing new constructions that enhance the expressivity in these
cases.
3 Introducing Extended Utility State Machines
In this section we formally deﬁne the state machines that we propose as an
appropriate formalism to deﬁne agents that incur in e-commerce activities. We
put a special emphasis in the novelties with respect to USMs. Essentially, an
extended utility state machine is a state machine where we introduce some ad-
ditional features to help in deﬁning e-commerce autonomous agents. Thus, we
have several states and transitions among them. Transitions have an associated
condition, that is, a transition can be performed only if the condition holds.
Each transition also contains an action. This action can be either to change the
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value of some variables that the agent is controlling or to send a message to
another agent. A particular case of action is associated with exchanges of re-
sources, that is, two agents exchange messages, inducing a common transaction.
The conﬁguration of a EUSM is given by the current state and the current value
of the variables. Finally, the operational semantics of our machines, indicating
how such a machine evolves, is deﬁned as follows:
– If there exists a transition from the current state where the condition holds
then this transition can be performed.
– If there is more than one transition with the condition holding then there is
a non-deterministic choice among all the possibilities.
– If there does not exist such a transition then the machine can let the time
pass until one of the conditions hold.
The previous description of our state machines coincides with the classical
notion. The important diﬀerence so far comes from the introduction of util-
ity functions. In our framework, each EUSM has a function associating a utility
function with each state. These functions have three parameters (the value of
the variables V , an agent identiﬁer id, and a time t) and return a real number
indicating the utility of having the values of the variables V , at time t, after
interacting with agent id. Thus, one of the main roles of utility functions con-
sists in deciding whether a future exchange of resources with a certain agent will
be good according to the current available information. So, utility functions are
used to guide both current and future exchanges. However, we can give more
sophisticated uses. For example, since the utility function takes as parameter all
the available variables, we can decide to refuse a purchase at a low price because
our record indicates that the prices are decreasing very fast. In this line, utility
functions will be used to decide whether a vendor purchases components, at a
given price, by taking into account the requests previously received. So, utility
functions can be used to deﬁne complex strategies. This is a big advantage with
respect to USMs [13,15]. In particular, in order to deﬁne agents as EUSMs, their
strategies will be codiﬁed in the utility functions. Thus, by leaving the utility
functions undeﬁned, we are providing a reusable pattern to create new agents
having a similar behavior but taking decisions in completely diﬀerent ways.
We have already mentioned that utility functions will be taking as parameter
a set of variables. Next, we describe the diﬀerent types of variables as well as their
roles in the framework of EUSMs. A distinguished set of variables will represent
resources. The idea is that all the agents participating in a multi-agent system
denote a speciﬁc resource with the same name; the rest of the variables will be
considered private and they can have arbitrary names. A distinguished variable
will be associated with the buﬀer (organized as a ﬁfo queue) storing incoming
messages. Symmetrically, another variable will refer to the port for outgoing
messages. Any message sent to this port will be received in the buﬀer associated
to the destination agent. The last distinguished variable is time.
In order to perform operations, agents will communicate with each other via
messages. A special kind of message are exchange messages. We consider two
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types of exchange messages: Proposal (denoted by expr) and acceptance (de-
noted by exac). The agent sending a proposal does not modify its resources until
it receives an acceptance from the partner. In both cases, these messages include
the exchanged resources as well as the id of the agent proposing the exchange.
This identiﬁer is useful to keep a record of transactions and, in particular, to
refer to deals that were reached but not concluded yet (e.g. the goods or the
payment were not received yet). For example, if an agent receives the message
(id4, expr({oranges =♦ 6,money =♦ −3})), this means that the id4 agent is
oﬀering 3 euros to purchase 6 oranges. Similarly, if the agent has as identiﬁer
id7 and, after evaluating the exchange with the utility function corresponding
to its current state, the deal is acceptable then the agent will send the mes-
sage (id7, exac({oranges =♦ −6,money =♦ 3})), indicating that it accepts the
exchange.
Deﬁnition 1. Let M be a data type. A data type L is a list data type for M if
it is deﬁned as follows: [ ] ∈ L; if l ∈ L and m ∈ M then m · l ∈ L.
Let l ∈ L. We consider that li denotes the i-th element of l. Besides, tail(l)
represents the result of eliminating l1 in l, while enqueue(l,m) represents the
result of inserting m as the new last element of l.
Let v1, . . . , vn be diﬀerent identiﬁers and t1, . . . , tn be data types. We say that
V = {v1 : t1, . . . , vn : tn} is a set of variables.
Let R and A be disjoint sets of identiﬁer names. We consider
S =
{
{r1 =♦ x1, . . . , rk =♦ xk}
∣∣∣∣∀ 1 ≤ i ≤ k : (ri ∈ R ∧ xi ∈ IR) ∧∀ 1 ≤ i, j ≤ k, i = j : ri = rj
}
Let ExchProposal = {expr(s)|s ∈ S} and ExchAccept = {exac(s)|s ∈ S}.
We say that M = A × Info, for some type Info such that ExchProposal ∪
ExchAccept ⊆ Info, is a messages data type for resources R and agents A. 	unionsq
Example 1. Let us consider the set of agents A = {Jimmy,Mary, Johnny} and
the set of resources R = {oranges, apples}. Any messages data type for R and
A includes, e.g., the messages (Johnny, expr({oranges =♦ 3, apples =♦ −2}))
and (Mary, exac({apples =♦ 4})). Moreover, depending on the deﬁnition of the
type Info considered in the previous deﬁnition, other messages not involving an
exchange proposal (expr) or an exchange acceptance (exac) could be included
as well. For example, if hello ∈ Info then (Jimmy, hello) is also a message
included in the messages data type. 	unionsq
Next we introduce some concepts related to variables in EUSMs. An extended set
of variables includes some special variables that must be present in the machine
(time, buﬀer of incoming messages, port for outgoing messages). In this set,
variable representing resources are explicitly marked. An assignment associates
each variable identiﬁer with its current value.
Deﬁnition 2. Let V = {v1 : t1, . . . , vn : tn} a set of variables. Let R and A be
disjoint sets of identiﬁer names, Messages be a messages data type for resources
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R and agents A, and MessagesList be a list data type for Messages. We say
that (V,R) is an extended set of variables if the following conditions hold:
– {v : IR|v ∈ R} ⊆ V . Each resource is represented by a variable in the set.
– t : IR+ ∈ V represents the time.
– ib : MessagesList ∈ V represents the input buﬀer.
– op : Messages ∪ {⊥} ∈ V represents the message to be sent through the
output port. The symbol ⊥ indicates that no message is waiting to be sent.
Let us consider an extended set of variables E = (V,R). We say that a set
V = {v1 =♦ a1, . . . , vp =♦ ap} is an assignment for E if for all 1 ≤ i ≤ p we
have vi ∈ V and ai ∈ ti. The set of all assignments is denoted by Assign.
Let V ∈ Assign and v be an identiﬁer such that v ∈ {v′|∃ y′ : v′ =♦ y′ ∈ V}.
The update of the variable v with the value x in V , denoted by V [v := x], is the
substitution of the former value of v by x. Formally,
V [v := x] = {v′ =♦ y′|v′ =♦ y′ ∈ V ∧ v′ = v} ∪ {v =♦ x}
We extend this operation to update k variables in the expected way:
V [v1 := x1, v2 := x2, . . . vk := xk] = (. . . ((V [v1 := x1])[v2 := x2]) . . . [vk := xk])
Let V ,V ′ ∈ Assign be assignments. The addition of V and V ′, denoted by
V + V ′, is deﬁned as
{v′ =♦ x′|v′ =♦ x′ ∈ V ∧  ∃ y′ : v′ =♦ y′ ∈ V ′}
∪
{v′ =♦ x′|v′ =♦ x′ ∈ V ′ ∧  ∃ y′ : v′ =♦ y′ ∈ V}
∪
{v′ =♦ x′ + y′|v′ =♦ x′ ∈ V ∧ v′ =♦ y′ ∈ V ′}
Let A be a set of agent identiﬁer names. A utility function is any function f :
A × Assign → IR+. The set of all utility functions is denoted by UtilFuncs. 	unionsq
Example 2. The EUSM representing a vendor in the Supply Chain Management
Game communicates with clients and suppliers by using some messages. Be-
sides, they will keep some variables to control their interactions. Figure 1 shows
the messages agents can send/receive to/from customers and suppliers, as well
as the set of variables that agents keep. Vendors use some variables to regis-
ter past interactions with clients and suppliers (requests for quotes to be at-
tended, proposed quotes, actual commitments, and historical transactions). In
this way, they know what to expect from them in subsequent turns. These vari-
ables are sets where each element keeps the corresponding interaction message
as well as the sender/receiver of the message and other relevant data. Other vari-
ables represent resources, the time consumed in the current state, the remain-
ing capacity of the factory in this turn, and all mandatory variables previously
introduced. 	unionsq
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Types of messages: Variables:
ClientRFQ : Client requests a quote to agent
crfq(pcModel, units)
AgentRFQ : Agent requests a quote to supplier
arfq(compModel, units)
AgentQ : An agent sends a quote to a client
aq(pcModel, units, price, deadline, penalty)
SupplierQ : A supplier sends a quote to an agent
sq(compModel, units, price, deadline, penalty)
AcceptAgentQ : Client accepts quote from agent
aaq(pcModel, units, price, deadline, penalty)
AcceptSupplierQ : Agent accepts quote from sup.
asq(compModel, units, price, deadline, penalty)
expr(E) : The exchange E is proposed
E ∈ Assign
exac(E) : The exchange E is accepted
E ∈ Assign
Resources:
money: money units
pcModelx: units of model x PC
compModely : units of component y
Mandatory variables: t, ib, op
st: Time EUSM moved to the current state
factoryCap: # PCs the EUSM can still build
- Registering interactions with clients:
RFQfromClients: received RFQs
(client, clientRFQ)
QtoClients: quotes sent to clients
(client, agentQ)
CwithClients: commitments with clients
(client, agentQ)
HwithClients: past transactions with clients
(client, agentQ, delay, finalPrice)
- Registering interact. with suppliers:
RFQtoSuppliers: RFQs asked to suppliers
(supplier, agentRFQ)
QfromSuppliers: Qs from suppliers
(supplier, supplierQ)
CwithSuppliers: commitments with sup.
(supplier, supplierQ)
HwithSuppliers: past transactions with sup.
(supplier, supplierQ, delay, finalPrice)
Fig. 1. Messages and variables managed by vendors
Next we introduce our notion of state machine. In the next deﬁnition we use
the term explicit transition to denote all the transitions contained in the set of
transitions. The idea is that there are other transitions that are not included in
that set: Time transitions.
Deﬁnition 3. An Extended Utility State Machine, in the following EUSM, is a
tuple M = (id, S, E, U, s0,V0, T ) where:
– id is the (unique) agent identiﬁer of M .
– S is the set of states and s0 is the initial state.
– E is the extended set of variables and V0 is the initial assignment.
– U : S −→ UtilFuncs is a function associating a utility function with each
state.
– T is the set of explicit transitions. For all transition γ = (s1, C, Z, s2) ∈ T
we have
• s1, s2 ∈ S denote the initial and ﬁnal states of the transition, respectively.
• C : Assign× Extra −→ Bool is the transition condition, where Extra is
a data type.
• Z : Assign× Extra → Assign is the transition transformation.
A conﬁguration of M is a tuple (s,V) where s ∈ S and V is an assignment
for E. 	unionsq
We consider that all the variables belonging to the extended set of variables
appear in the initial assignment. As we will see later in Deﬁnition 4 the C and
Formal Speciﬁcation of Multi-agent Systems by Using EUSMs 327
s2 s3 s4
s1
s7 s6 s5
(s1, C101 , Z101 , s2)
(s2, C32 , Z32 , s3) (s3, C33 , Z33 , s4)
(s4, C24 , Z24 , s5)
(s5, C25 , Z25 , s6)(s6, C26 , Z26 , s7)
(s7, C27 , Z27 , s1)
(s1, Ci1, Zi1, s1), 1 ≤ i ≤ 9
(s2, Ci2, Zi2, s2), 1 ≤ i ≤ 2 (s3, Ci3, Zi3, s3), 1 ≤ i ≤ 2 (s4, C14 , Z14 , s4)
(s5, C15 , Z15 , s5)(s6, C16 , Z16 , s6)(s7, C17 , Z17 , s7)
Fig. 2. EUSM denoting an agent
Z functions work as follows: If there exists e such that C(V , e) holds then V
is substituted by Z(V , e). Let us note that there may exist several values of e
such that C(V , e) holds. In these cases, the EUSM will be provided with diﬀerent
nondeterministic choices. Next we introduce the EUSM deﬁning the behavior of a
vendor in our case study. In particular, we show how C and Z can coordinate
to ﬁnd/use the extra parameter e.
Example 3. We consider that the interactions of the vendor with the environ-
ment are deﬁned by using several states. Exchange proposals, on the basis
of the utility function of the agent associated with the current state, are ac-
cepted/rejected. The objective of each state conforming the EUSM consists in
dealing with a kind of messages or agent activities. The resulting EUSM will be
denoted by A. The graphical presentation of A is given in Figure 2.
In order to illustrate the behavior of the C and Z functions, let us con-
sider the agent transition tran12 = (s2, C
1
2 , Z
1
2 , s2), which links the state s2 with
itself. This transition deﬁnes how the agent takes a client RFQ from its set
RFQfromClients and composes a quote q to be sent back to the client. For the
sake of simplicity, in this approach the quote penalty (i.e., the price reduction
due to a delayed delivery per time unit) will be 0. The transition condition C12
requires that a client RFQ of the form (client, crfq(pcModelz, units)) is found
in RFQfromClients. Besides, C12 requires ﬁnding a quote that is proﬁtable for
the agent, that is, a quote that would improve the utility in s2. In order to do
that, it searches for some values price and deadline such that exchanging units
PCs of model pcModelz by price at time deadline would improve the utility of
the agent, given by U(s2). If such values of price and deadline are found then
C12 returns True and these parameters are passed to function Z
1
2 . The function
Z12 removes the concerned client RFQ to avoid processing it again. Besides, it
composes a quote q with the considered parameters price and deadline. The
quote is inserted in the set of quotes QtoClients and it is written in the output
port op so that it is sent to the client. Formally, we have
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C12
 

V,
(price,
deadline)

=















True if (client, crfq(pcModelz, units)) ∈ RFQfromClients
∧
U(s2)
 
client, V +



pcModelz =♦ −units,
t =♦ deadline,
money =♦ price
	





>
U(s2)(client,V + {t =♦ deadline})
False otherwise
Z12
 

V,
(price,
deadline)

= V




RFQfromClients :=
RFQfromClients\(client, crfq(pcModelz, units)),
QtoClients := QtoClients ∪ {(client, q)},
op := (client, q)




where q is deﬁned as aq(pcModelz, units, deadline, price, 0).
Next we show a possible utility function to analyze the suitability of transac-
tions in s2. In the next expression, prodCosti denotes the estimated production
cost of a model i PC. It can be calculated by taking into account CwithClients,
CwithSuppliers, HwithClients, and HwithSuppliers. Besides, the utility func-
tion will discourage sending quotes that are clearly unacceptable for the other
part, which would be a waste of time. A value maxAcceptablePriceid,z denotes
the maximal price the agent estimates the client id would pay for a PC of
model z. This value can be computed from HwithClients by considering previ-
ous interactions with this or other clients. Let us note that sending a quote to an
entity or accepting a quote from one of them (in our system, a supplier) are very
diﬀerent activities in terms of strategy. In the latter case, which is considered in
the next state s3, we would actually accept excessively proﬁtable (low) prices,
because the other part implicitly accepted the transaction by sending the quote.
U(s2)(id,V)= money+z min(maxAcceptablePriceid,z, (prodCostz + δ))·pcModelz
	unionsq
Let us comment on the previous expression. It is the addition of some terms.
The ﬁrst term denotes the value given to money, while the rest ones denote the
value given to PCs of each model. The relation between the value of money and
the value of a given PC model is the key to decide whether an exchange (in
this case, a sale) involving this model is acceptable or not. Let us note that the
number of PCs of each model is multiplied by a factor. This multiplicative factor
implicitly denotes the exchange ratio that is acceptable for the agent when PCs
of this model are sold. For example, if this factor is equal to 1500, then 1500
units of the resource money (that is, $1500) receive the same value than one
PC of the model where this factor is applied. Thus, selling this PC at any price
higher than or equal to this value will be acceptable, because in this case the
value returned by the utility function will be at least the same as before. Finally,
let us note that the multiplicative factor is the minimum between the maximal
price the agent thinks the buyer would pay for a PC of this model and the cost
of producing it (plus a small amount δ).
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4 Evolutions in EUSMs
In order to deﬁne the operational behavior of a EUSM, as we said before, we
consider two types of evolutions: Explicit evolutions (labelled by exp) and tem-
poral evolutions (labelled by tm). An evolution is denoted by a tuple (c, c′)K ,
with K ∈ {exp, tm}, where c is the former conﬁguration and c′ is the new
conﬁguration. Let us note that, for a given c and K, there might exist several
conﬁgurations c′ such that (c, c′)K is an evolution. Single evolutions of a EUSM
can be concatenated to conform a trace.
Deﬁnition 4. Let M = (id, S, E, U, s0,V0, T ) be a EUSM and c = (s,V) be a
conﬁguration of M . Let us consider that t =♦ time ∈ V . An evolution of M
from c is a pair (c, c′)K , where c′ = (s′,V ′) and K ∈ {exp, tm} are deﬁned in
such a way that one of the following conditions holds:
(1) (Explicit evolution) If there exists (s, C, Z, s′′) ∈ T and e such that C(V , e) =
True then K = exp, s′ = s′′, and V ′ = Z(V , e).
(2) (Passing of time) If the condition of (1) does not hold then K = tm, s′ = s,
and V ′ = V [t := β], where
β ≤ min {β′ |β′ > time ∧ ∃ (s, C, Z, s′′) ∈ T , e : C(V [t := β′], e) = True}
We denote by Evolutions(M, c) the set of evolutions of M from c.
Let M = (id, S, E, U, s0,V0, T ) be a EUSM and c1, . . . , cn be conﬁgurations
such that c1 = (s0,V0) and for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n − 1 we have (ci, ci+1)Ki ∈
Evolutions(M, ci). Then, we say that c1 =⇒ cn is a trace of M . The set of
traces of M is denoted by Traces(M, c1). 	unionsq
Example 4. Next we show an evolution in the context of our running example.
We will suppose that the variable t denotes the time in days, and money denotes
the amount of dollars owned by the agent. Let c = (s2,V) be a conﬁguration
where pcModel8 =♦ 10, money =♦ 200, t =♦ 5, and QtoClients =♦ ∅ are in V ,
that is, the agent owns 10 PCs of model 8 and $200, it is day 5, and the set of
quotes sent to clients is empty. Besides, let us consider RFQfromClients =♦
{(client15, crfq(pcModel8, 1)} ∈ V , that is, client 15 requested a quote to buy
one PC of model 8.
Besides, let U(s2)(client15,V+{t =♦ 2, pcModel8=♦−1,money=♦999}) >
U(s2)(client15,V + {t =♦ 2}), that is, the agent would accept to sell a PC of
model 8 to client 15 by $999 in day 5 + 2 = 7. In this case, tran12 can be taken:
By setting the parameters price and deadline to 999 and 7, respectively, C12
holds.
Let V ′ = Z12 (V , (999, 7)), i.e., the only variations between V and V ′ are that
RFQfromClients=♦ ∅, QtoClients=♦ {(client15, aq(pcModel8, 1, 7, 999, 0))},
and op =♦ (client15, aq(pcModel8, 1, 7, 999, 0)). Let c′ = (s′,V ′). Then, we have
(c, c′)exp ∈ Evolutions(A, c) and c =⇒ c′ ∈ Traces(A, c), being A the EUSM of
our running example. 	unionsq
330 M.G. Merayo, M. Nu´n˜ez, and I. Rodr´ıguez
5 Deﬁning Multi-agent Systems with EUSMs
In our formalism, a system is just a tuple of agents. The evolutions of a system
are deﬁned from the ones corresponding to the individual agents by taking into
account the following: If an agent can perform an explicit transition (that is,
the condition of a transition from the current state holds) then the transition
is performed. If the transition creates a message in the port of outgoing mes-
sages then the message is enqueued in the buﬀer of incoming messages of the
corresponding agent. Afterwards, the message must be removed from the port
of outgoing messages (this is simulated by setting the message to the ⊥ value).
Finally, if no condition holds then all the agents idle an amount of time less than
or equal to the time needed for a condition to hold.
Deﬁnition 5. Let M1, . . . ,Mn be EUSMs such that for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n we have
Mi = (idi, Si, Ei, Ui, s0i,V0i, Ti) and Ei = (Vi, Ri). If R1 = . . . = Rn then we
say that the tuple S = (M1, . . . ,Mn) is a system of EUSMs. A conﬁguration of S
is a tuple (c1, . . . , cn), where for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n we have that ci is a conﬁguration
of Mi.
Let S = (M1, . . . ,Mn) be a system. Let c = (c1, . . . , cn) be a conﬁguration of
S, where for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n we have ci = (si,Vi). An evolution of S from c is a
pair (c, c′)K , where c′ = (c′1, . . . , c
′
n) and K ∈ {exp, tm} are deﬁned in such a
way that one of the following conditions hold:
(1) (Explicit evolution) If there exist 1 ≤ i ≤ n and d = (s′,V ′) such that
(ci, d)exp ∈ Evolutions(Mi, ci), then K = exp and we consider the following
possibilities:
(1.a) (No communication) If op =♦ ⊥ ∈ V ′ then we have c′i = d and for all
1 ≤ j ≤ n with j = i we have c′j = cj .
(1.b) (The agent communicates) If op =♦ (idj ,m) ∈ V ′, for some 1 ≤ j ≤ n,
then c′i = (s
′,V ′[op := ⊥]), c′j = (sj ,Vj [ib := enqueue(ib, (idi,m))]) and
for all 1 ≤ k ≤ n, with k = i, j, we have c′k = ck.
(2) (Passing of time) If there exists newtime ∈ IR+ such that for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n
we have (ci, c′′i )tm ∈ Evolutions(Mi, ci), with c′′i = (si,Vi[t := newtime]),
then for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n we have c′i = c′′i and K = tm.
We denote by Evolutions(S, c) the set of evolutions of S from c.
Let S = (M1, . . . ,Mn) be a system with Mi = (idi, Si, Ei, Ui, si0,Vi0, Ti)
for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Besides, let c1, . . . , cn be conﬁgurations such that we have
c1 = ((s10,V10), . . . , (sn0,Vn0) and for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n − 1 we have (ci, ci+1)Ki ∈
Evolutions(S, ci). We say that c1 =⇒ cn is a trace of S. The set of traces of S
is denoted by Traces(S, c1). 	unionsq
6 Deﬁning EUSMs: General Guidelines
In this section we provide some general guidelines to properly deﬁne agents by
means of EUSMs. First, let us note that our language focuses on splitting the
behavior of each agent in two separate parts:
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(a) Tasks: They are the actions the agent must perform. In order to properly
deﬁne their behavior, states, transitions, and variables of the EUSM can be
used.
(b) Strategic decisions: They refer to all the situations where the agent must
choose among some choices in such a way that its decision may aﬀect the
future chances of success. This part of the agent should be deﬁned by means
of utility functions associated to states of the EUSM.
In general, the strategy of an agent is deﬁned by the utility functions gov-
erning each state. Thus, the selection of suitable utility functions dramatically
depends on the kind of strategic behavior we want to provide the agent with. In
fact, if we leave undeﬁned the utility functions associated to states, an EUSM pro-
vides a reusable framework to design agents with diﬀerent strategy choices. For
example, if we consider the speciﬁcation described in the previous section and
we remove utility functions, we obtain a generic reusable framework for deﬁning
vendor agents in the Supply Chain Management Game. In particular, the same
speciﬁcation allows to consider diﬀerent strategies by just associating diﬀerent
suites of utility functions to states.
Tasks involving decision-making, optimization, etc. should be abstracted by
means of the utility functions. Let us note that utility functions provide an
implicit deﬁnition of what is preferable: In any situation where some choices
are available, the best choice is, by deﬁnition, the one returning the highest
utility. Sometimes, ﬁnding the values that maximize a utility function may be a
hard task, specially if the form of utility functions is not constrained to a given
form (in general, if the searching space is ﬁnite, it is an NP-hard problem).
Hence, given a speciﬁcation deﬁned by means of an EUSM, an implementation
should not be required to ﬁnd the optimal choices in general. Depending on the
time/optimality necessities, the method followed by an implementation to ﬁnd
good enough suboptimal choices should be based on a suitable tradeoﬀ. Let us
note that these issues do not concern the EUSM because they are implementation
details.
Due to space limitations we cannot include the remaining parts of the case
study that we are using along the paper. The objective of each state consists
in dealing with a certain kind of messages by considering the agent preferences
established by means of utility functions.
7 Conclusions and Future Work
In this paper we have presented a formalism called extended utility state ma-
chines, in short EUSMs. We have illustrated the behavior of these machines with
a medium-size example: The speciﬁcation of vendors in the Supply Chain Man-
agement Game. EUSMs are a big improvement with respect to the original USM
formalism. In particular, strategic behavior can be now deﬁned in an easier and
more direct way. In this paper we tried to keep a balance between theory (by
introducing a formal language) and practice (by applying the language to the
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speciﬁcation of a benchmark in e-commerce agents). Our work needs a natural
continuation in both directions. Regarding the more theoretical component, our
previous results for USMs should be adapted to the new framework. Regarding
the more practical component, we are assessing the formalism with other case
studies that are not related to e-commerce. Speciﬁcally, we are continuing the
work initiated in [25] by specifying in our formalism not only the Interactive
Driving System, but the next layer of the system containing it.
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